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British demands are testing the patience of our European neighbours, says Nick Witney, as the
country hitherto regarded as a pragmatic ally has become obstructive and unhelpful.
What do Britain’s EU partners make of the Brexit saga? The picture emerging from European
Council on Foreign Relations‘ European-wide network of offices and researchers is essentially
one of perplexity and frustration. Across Europe, Britain is perceived as already enjoying an
extraordinarily privileged position within the EU. The budget rebate means that these days
luckless Italy makes a bigger net contribution to the EU budget than the UK. Britain did not
want the euro, so has an opt-out (and crows about how well its economy is doing as a
consequence). Ditto Schengen (so that, the movement of other Europeans excepted, Britain retains full “control of
its borders” – whatever the rhetoric to the contrary). Ditto cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (where
the UK has even been allowed to choose which bits to stick with, and which to reject).
More broadly, too, the whole EU enterprise has developed on British-preferred lines: Britain urged that the Union be
hugely enlarged to the east, and it has been; Britain prioritised the single market, and that is what the EU now has;
Britain fought for open trading and investment relationships with the wider world, and that is now EU policy. In
partners’ eyes, the British have their cake and eat it – and yet are still unsatisfied. So to perplexity and frustration is
added resentment, in varying degrees – which recent British behaviour has done little to assuage.
The new member states from central and eastern Europe were uniformly well-disposed to the UK when it was the
leading advocate of EU enlargement – but have now been almost as uniformly estranged by British determination to
block their migrant workers. Britain used to be a leader of European defence; now it is seen as obstructive,
persistently blocking the European military and security headquarters in Brussels which everyone else wants, and
vetoing development of the European Defence Agency. Furthermore, British refusal to take any part in helping either
southern economies stricken by the economic crisis or with the hundreds of thousands of displaced people now
washing around Europe has earned it no friends, except perhaps Hungary’s Viktor Orbán.
Nonetheless, other EU member states would generally prefer the UK to remain. Many fear the boost an Out vote
would give to populist and nationalist forces across the continent, from Eastern Europe to Scandinavia to France.
Disintegrative forces, too: if the UK leaves the EU, and Scotland leaves the UK, what chance is there of resisting
Catalan, or Flemish, independence? Nor are many member states attracted by the prospect of an EU increasingly
dominated by Germany, or the Franco-German pairing, without Britain there to provide balance.
Some have their own, more specific, reasons for hoping that Britain stays. Free-traders such as Germany and
Sweden see the UK as a valuable ally in ensuring an outward-facing EU. Italy sees common ground in British
ambitions for development of the single market, particularly its digital dimension. France, long suspicious of Britain
as a US “Trojan horse” and advocate of dangerous Anglo-Saxon free-market liberalism, can console itself with its
recent (albeit unlooked-for) elevation as the US’s preferred military partner in Europe, and sees the value of
retaining in the EU another nuclear power and fellow permanent member of the UN Security Council.
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Federica Mogherini, vice-president of the European Commission, speaks at this year’s European Defence
Agency conference. Photo: European External Action Service  via a Flickr Creative Commons licence.
Indeed, most of Britain’s EU partners are conscious of the damage Brexit would do to European influence in the
world. The international perception would be that the EU’s economic failure of recent years was being followed by
political failure, with further decline and possibly unravelling to follow. The contempt in which Putin – and other
authoritarian nationalists from Beijing to Baku to Cairo – already tend to hold the EU would be encouraged and
confirmed, and the ability of the remaining 27 to protect their interests and promote their values in a world where
liberal democracy is on the retreat would suffer a body blow. (The same, of course, could be said of a post-Brexit
UK.) Britain’s partners know that the EU would be losing not just any old member state, but one of its star
international players – a country with a robust approach on defence and security and close transatlantic links, as
well as the capacity and historical inclination to operate on the global stage.
Against that, our partners are also aware that this inclination has not been much in evidence in recent years –
certainly not since the first Cameron government came to power in 2010. What the Obama administration has
characterised as the UK’s excessively “accommodating” attitude to China has dented its reputation for robustness.
And wherever our partners might have expected or at least hoped that the British would be engaged, they have
been conspicuous by their absence: from French-led efforts to combat lawlessness in the Sahel; to the projected
bombing of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces in 2013; and crisis diplomacy, led in the end by the Franco-
German couple, following Putin’s assaults on Ukraine. Instead, the traditionally “pragmatic” British seem to have
been more concerned with conducting a sort of legal guerrilla campaign in Brussels, on the constant hunt for
“competence creep”.
This has manifested itself in such actions as persistent efforts to clip the wings of the fledgling European External
Action Service, by preventing it from speaking on behalf of the member states. Britain has even attempted to
challenge the exclusive authority of the Commission, and then of the European Parliament in the ratification process
over trade deals – thus complicating the implementation of just those open-market policies which Britain is meant to
favour.
There are compensating factors. The competence of British diplomats and officials is widely respected. Britain has
also been decisive in holding the line on sanctions against Russia. And this is not the first time that other member
states have had to put up with one of their number’s monomaniacal pursuit of a national line “of principle”,
irrespective of any wider consideration – see Cyprus passim. But better is expected of the Brits – and their constant
refusal to lend a helping hand, as over the refugee crisis, is wearing patience dangerously thin.
A properly committed and engaged UK would be widely welcomed by its EU partners. Especially in foreign and
security policy, British leadership would not only be welcomed, but followed. The sad truth is, however, that the
departure of the obstructive and unhelpful UK of recent years would, in and of itself, elicit few tears. Any efforts
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partners are still ready to make to help Cameron in his “renegotiation” will be made less by warmth towards the
British than fear of Brexit’s impact on the cohesion, the balance, and even the sustainability of the remainder of the
EU.
Nick Witney is co-director of the European Power programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and a
senior policy fellow there. He previously served as the first chief executive of the European Defence Agency  in
Brussels. He previously worked for the FCO and the Ministry of Defence, where his last job before leaving for
Brussels was as the MOD’s director-general of International Security Policy.
This is an extract from the European Council for Foreign Relations’ paper, Brexit to Nowhere: the foreign policy
consequences of ‘out’. It does not represent the views of the BrexitVote blog, nor those of the LSE.
Copyright © 2015 London School of Economics
3/3
